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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - 2014
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373726
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Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
Lazarova, Emiliya A.; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, … - In: Theory and decision : an international journal for … 81 (2016) 1, pp. 53-71
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593939
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A unifying model for matching situations
Tejada, Oriol; Borm, Peter; Lohman, E. - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230607
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An iterative procedure for evaluating digraph competitions
Borm, Peter (contributor); Brink, René van den (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001733285
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - 2014
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010491315
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Transfers and Exchange-Stability in Two-Sided Matching Problems
Lazarova, Emiliya; Borm, Peter; Estévez-Fernández, Arantza - Tinbergen Instituut - 2014
In this paper we consider one-to-many matching problems where the preferences of the agents involved are represented by … matching to a matching of maximum total reward, one can always provide a compensation schedule that will be ex-post stable in … uses the fact that the core of an associated compensation matching game with constraints is nonempty. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011257556
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The Influence of Secrecy on the Communication Structure of Covert Networks
Borm, Peter; Lindelauf, R.; Hamers, H.J.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008
and information scenarios this dilemma is modeled as a game theoretic bargaining problem over the set of connected graphs … be detected. If the probability that an individual is exposed as member of the network depends on the information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092758
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Informationally Robust Equlibria
Reijnierse, Hans; Borm, Peter; Voorneveld, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003
Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090474
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Inventory Games
Borm, Peter; Meca-Martinez, A.; Timmer, J.B.; … - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1999
AMS classifications: 90D12, 90B05.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090632
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On the Rule of Chance Moves and Information in Two-Person Games
Borm, Peter; Dreef, M.R.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003
The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context.The central question in these … studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players … the value of information for a special class of two-person games.For these games we also investigate how badly the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091345