The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

In several jurisdictions, commercially exploiting a game of chance (rather than skill) is subject to a licensing regime. It is obvious that roulette is a game of chance and chess a game of skill, but the law does not provide a precise description of where the boundary between the two classes is...

The concept of Berge equilibria is based on supportive behavior among the players: each player is supported by the group of all other players. In this paper, we extend this concept by maintaining the idea of supportive behavior among the players, but eliminating the underlying coordination...

The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context. The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players. Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

An aspect of casino games that in general leads to discussions among both participants and spectators, is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to distinguish...

The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class, the set of Nash equilibria is convex, equilibrium strategies are exchangeable, and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive...