Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in<br/>queuing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is...

This article investigates the structural position of covert (terrorist or criminal) networks. Using the secrecy versus information tradeoff characterization of covert networks it is shown that their network structures are generally not small-worlds, in contradistinction to many overt social...

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex...

This paper extends the concepts of proper equilibria, protective behaviour and prudent behaviour to multicriteria games.Three types of proper equilibria based on different types of domination are introduced.It is shown that protective behaviour coincides with prudent behaviour.Possible relations...

Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games.Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...

An interesting aspect of games is the relative extent to which a player can positively influence his results by making appropriate strategic choices. This question is closely related to the issue of how to distinguish between games of skill and games of chance. The distinction between these two...

In this paper we introduce multiple longest traveling salesman (MLTS) games. An MLTS game arises from a network in which a salesman has to visit each node (player) precisely once, except its home location, in an order that maximizes the total reward.First it is shown that the value of a...

For cooperative games with transferable utility, convexity has turned out to be an important and widely applicable concept.Convexity can be defined in a number of ways, each having its own specific attractions.Basically, these definitions fall into two categories, namely those based on a...

Fall back equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly- ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has to decide beforehand on a back-up...