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The value of information has been the subject of many studies in a strategic context. The central question in these studies is how valuable the information hidden in the chance moves of a game is for one or more of the players. Generally speaking, only the extra possibilities that are beneficial...
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The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...
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Covert organizations are constantly faced with a tradeoff between secrecy and operational effciency. Lindelauf, Borm and Hamers (2008) developed a theoretical framework to determine optimal homogeneous networks taking the above mentioned considerations explicitly into account. In this paper this...
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In several jurisdictions, commercially exploiting a game of chance (rather than skill) is subject to a licensing regime. It is obvious that roulette is a game of chance and chess a game of skill, but the law does not provide a precise description of where the boundary between the two classes is...
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The concept of Berge equilibria is based on supportive behavior among the players: each player is supported by the group of all other players. In this paper, we extend this concept by maintaining the idea of supportive behavior among the players, but eliminating the underlying coordination...
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The class of two-person competition games is introduced and analyzed. For any game in this class, the set of Nash equilibria is convex, equilibrium strategies are exchangeable, and all Nash equilibria lead to the same payoff vector. Competition games are compared to other competitive...
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Informationally Robust Equilibria (IRE) are introduced in Robson (1994) as a refinement of Nash equilibria for e.g. bimatrix games, i.e. mixed extensions of two person finite games. Similar to the concept of perfect equilibria, basically the idea is that an IRE is a limit of some sequence of...
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