We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …

different distributions. Furthermore, we also analyze second-price all-pay auction. Finally, we show that individual minimum … bids could improve the relative revenue performance of first-price all-pay compared to first-price winner-pay auction …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … exists in the second-price auction and the English auction. We establish there is no equivalence between these two auction … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a … reveals the winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first‐price sealed‐bid auction in which the winner …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner’s payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner’s payment is …