In an overlapping generations economy households (lenders) fund risky investment projects of firms (borrowers) by drawing up loan contracts on the basis of asymmetric information. An optimal contract entails either the issue of only debt or the issue of both debt and equity according to whether...

This paper presents an analysis of the role of information in determining the growth and development prospects of economies. In an overlapping generations model, producers of capital choose between two types of technology - safe and risky. Depending on the information available, decision making...

This paper presents an analysis of income distribution based on an overlapping generations model of imperfect capital markets, technological non-convexities and information acquisition. Heterogeneous, altruistic agents apply for loans from financial intermediaries to undertake risky investment...

This paper presents an analysis of the joint determination of bureaucratic corruption and economic development. The analysis is based on a simple neo-classical growth model in which bureaucrats are employed as agents of the government to collect taxes from households. Corruption is reflected in...

This paper explores how the optimal mode of public finance depends on the stage of economic development. The theoretical analysis is based on an overlapping generations growth model with an imperfect capital market. Random shocks create a demand for liquidity and establish a role for financial...

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are charged with the responsibility for procuring public goods which contribute to...

This paper examines the growth effects of government expenditure for a panel of thirty developing countries over the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, with a particular focus on sectoral expenditures. Our methodology improves on previous research on this topic by explicitly recognising the role of...

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These...