We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions...

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist nondictatorial social welfare functions...

We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist non-dictatorial social welfare functions...

Single-plateaued preferences generalize single-peaked preferences by allowing for multiple best elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singleplateauedness in a choice-theoretic setting....

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategyproof if misreporting one’s preference never produces a social ordering that is strictly between the original ordering...

Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singlebasinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In...

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen,...

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on...

This paper analyzes variable-population social-evaluation principles in a framework where outcomes are uncertain. We provide characterizations of expected-utility versions of critical-level generalized utilitarian rules. These principles evaluate lotteries over possible states of the world on...

In an infinite-horizon setting, Ferejohn and Page showed that any social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s axioms and stationarity must be a dictatorship of the first generation. Packel strengthened this result by proving that no collective choice rule generating complete social preferences...