The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 89, Number 4, November 2007.

We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and “risk rationing,” whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe,...

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/03/05.

This article evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in Peru. We develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. Just...

We develop a model of sorting and matching between borrowers and lenders across formal and informal credit markets in a developing country context. We highlight the role of risk both on credit access and sectoral choice. We examine how activity and sectoral choice vary across agents with...

This paper evaluates the performance of a rural credit market in Peru. We develop a model that shows that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to asymmetric information can lead not just to quantity rationing but also to transaction cost rationing and risk rationing. Just like...

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/03/05.

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics.

This paper provides a methodological bridge leading from the well-developed theory of credit rationing to the less developed territory of empirically identifying credit constraints. We begin by developing a simple model showing that credit constraints may take three forms: quantity rationing,...