This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed...

Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We study via simulation the effect of intercorrelated preferences on...

This paper examines the dynamic impact of matching on economic mobility and growth. To account for complex interactions over time, experimental economies of heterogeneous agents are simulated with the match process acting as a fitness selection mechanism. Even with perfect information and...

Agents on the same side of a two-sided matching market (such as the marriage or labor market) compete with each other by making self-enhancing investments to improve their worth in the eyes of potential partners. Because these expenditures generally occur prior to matching, this activity has...

A rule for three-way division of profits based on peer evaluation reports is impartial if the calculation of each partner’s share ignores her report, and is consensual if it respects evaluations when the three partners’ reports are in agreement. We give an approximate solution to the problem...

This paper studies the inefficiency of one-to-one matching markets as measured by the price of stability. We begin by providing some theoretical upper bounds on this type of inefficiency, bounds that vary with the composition of participants’ ordinal preference lists. We then turn to...