We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg–Tirole's preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader's...

An ambiguity averse decision-maker contemplates investment of a fixed size capital into a project with a stochastic profit stream under the Knightian uncertainty. Multiple priors are modeled as a ``cloud" of diffusion processes with embedded compound Poisson jumps. The ``cloud" contains the...

We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg--Tirole's preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader's...

Models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning, but they are not suitable to study effects that accumulate over time. We propose a new class of models of strategic experimentation which...

I consider a stopping game between two players, where observations related to an unknown state of the nature arrive at random. Players not only learn from observing each other, but their payoffs also depend on the presence of the counterpart. I derive a general characterization of an equilibrium...

Risks related to events that arrive randomly play important role in many real life decisions, and models of learning and experimentation based on two-armed Poisson bandits addressed several important aspects related to strategic and motivational learning in cases when events arrive at jump times...

An ambiguity averse decision-maker contemplates investment of a fixed size capital into a project with a stochastic profit stream under the Knightian uncertainty. Multiple priors are modeled as a "cloud" of diffusion processes with embedded compound Poisson jumps. The "cloud" contains the...

We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg -- Tirole's preemption game. Two firms contemplate entering a new market with stochastic demand. Firms differ in sunk costs of entry. If the demand process has no upward jumps, the low cost firm enters first, and the high cost firm follows. If leader's...

We study a stochastic version of Fudenberg and Tirole's (1985) preemption game to analyze the effects of jumps in the underlying uncertainty on equilibrium strategies. Two firms contemplate entering a new market where the demand follows a jump-diffusion process. Firms differ is the sunk costs of...

I characterize an optimal, incentive compatible, and renegotiation proof contract of venture capital (VC ) financing of a startup (that may be successful or not) whose rate of arrival of success is a function of the accumulated investment stock. The contract depends on the startup valuation,...