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Hypercubes and Compromise Values for Cooperative Fuzzy Games

Brânzei, R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

AMS classification: 90D12; 03E72;

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090798

Cooperative Games with a Simpicial Core

Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2001

AMS classification: 91A12;

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092060

Additive Stable Solutions on Perfect Cones of Cooperative Games

Tijs, S.H.; Brânzei, R. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2001

Closed kernel systems of the coalition matrix turn out to correspond to cones of games on which the core correspondence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092335

A Technical Note on Lorenz Dominance in Cooperative Games

Sánchez-Soriano, J.; Brânzei, R.; Llorca, N.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010

AMS classification: 91A12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090477

Cones of Games arising from Market Entry Problems

Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H.; Timmer, J.B. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090705

Tree-connected Peer Group Situations and Peer Group Games

Brânzei, R.; Fragnelli, V.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2000

A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090722

Strongly Essential Coalitions and the Nucleolus of Peer Group Games

Brânzei, R.; Solymosi, T.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2003

case the core is not empty, the nucleolus and the kernelcore.As an application, we consider peer group games, and show that …Most of the known efficient algorithms designed to compute the nucleolus for special classes of balanced games are … based on two facts: (i) in any balanced game, the coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus are essential; and (ii …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090844

Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

Dall'Aglio, M.; Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

This paper defines models of cooperation among players partition- ing a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090851

Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

Alparslan-Gok, S.Z.; Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2008

In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the … interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is … proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090896

On Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Games

Tijs, S.H.; Brânzei, R.; Ishihara, S.; Muto, S. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2002

AMS classifications: 90D12; 03E72;

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090966