This paper focuses on new characterizations of convex interval games using the notions of exactness and superadditivity. We also relate big boss interval games with concave interval games and obtain characterizations of big boss interval games in terms of exactness and subadditivity.

How to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision-maker who faces uncertainty?This paper suggests some compensation rules.These are studied both in a cooperative and a noncooperative environment.

Multiglove markets and corresponding games are considered.For this class of games we introduce the notion of type monotonic allocation scheme.Allocation rules for multiglove markets based on weight systems are introduced and characterized.These allocation rules generate type monotonic allocation...

In this paper we consider information collecting (IC) situations where an action taker in an uncertain situation can improve his action choices by gathering information from some players who are more informed about the situation. Then the problem of sharing the gains when cooperating with...

Potential games and supermodular games are attractive games, especially because under certain conditions they possess pure Nash equilibria. Subclasses of games with a potential are considered which are also strategically equivalent to supermodular games. The focus is on two-person zero-sum games...

AMS classification: 91A12

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For...

A class of cooperative games is introduced which arises from situations in which a set of agents is hierarchically structured and where potential individual economic abilities interfere with the behavioristic rules induced by the organization structure.These games form a cone generated by a...

AMS classification: 90D12; 03E72;