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The rationality of surprise : unstable Nash equilibria and the theory of moves

Brams, Steven J. - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000887496

Fallback bargaining

Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001364656

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative truels : little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001555893

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative truels : little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001574701

Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter?

Bossert, Walter; Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, D. Marc - In: Games and economic behavior 40 (2002) 2, pp. 185-202

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001696037

A Generic Negotiation Game

Brams, Steven J. - In: Journal of Theoretical Politics 4 (1992) 1, pp. 53-66

A generic Negotiation Game (NG) is used to model a conflict between two parties seeking to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. NG is a 2 × 2 non-constant-sum symmetric game that is `generic' in the sense that its payoffs, which are assumed to be cardinal, are only incompletely...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011166207