We present a classroom public goods experiment based on a provision point mechanism, where subjects must make an all or nothing decision about providing the public good. We find that, as a teaching tool, this design is superior to traditional prisoners' dilemma games in which there exists a...

This study is the first to examine dual agency sales over the listing contract between seller and listing agent. We test hypotheses about the timing of dual agency and its effects on sales price and time on market. Probit results indicate that dual agency sales are more likely to occur near the...

Miceli (1989) in a search for the optimal time to allow a broker to market property provides a theoretical model which posits that the principal (seller) may use the length of the listing contract to motivate the agent (listing broker) to better align incentives. Expanding slightly on Miceli,...

This work empirically investigates the effect of the amount of time provided the broker to market property (listing contract length) on the likelihood of a successful marketing attempt. Do shorter listing contracts increase broker motivation or can contracts be so short that marketing efforts...