This study uses data from hospitals to test the hypothesis that management representation on nonprofit boards leads to "excessive" CEO pay, defined as compensation that exceeds the level predicted by a market wage model. We document a relatively small, but statistically significant, positive...

This paper examines the incentives of CEOs in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence suggests that the relations between financial performance (return on assets) and CEO turnover and compensation are as strong in nonprofit hospitals as in for-profit hospitals and other for-profit...

This study provides evidence on the determinants of contract duration using a large sample of franchise contracts. We find that the term of the contract systematically increases with the franchisee's physical and human capital investments, measures of recontracting costs, and the franchisor's...

This paper examines the incentives of CEOs in a large sample of nonprofit hospitals. The evidence indicates that both turnover and compensation of these CEOs are significantly related to financial performance (return on assets). We find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit...