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Two values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720713
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Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
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Games on union closed systems
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2011
coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383187
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Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert P. - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011255955
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Explicit and Latent Authority in Hierarchical Organizations
Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert P. - Tinbergen Institute - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decision makers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005144514
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Explicit and latent authority in hierarchical organizations
Brink, René van den; Gilles, Robert Paul - 2003
In this paper we consider the problem of the control of access to a firm's productive asset, embedding the relevant decisionmakers into a general structure of formal authority relations. Within such an authority structure, each decision maker acts as a principal to some decision makers, while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334333
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Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river
Li, Wenzhong; Xu, Genjiu; Brink, René van den - 2021
Consider a group of agents located along a polluted river where every agent must pay a certain cost for cleaning up the polluted river. Following the model of Ni and Wang (2007), we propose the class of α-Local Responsibility Sharing methods, which generalizes the Local Responsibility Sharing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012511448
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The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Instituut
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256619
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The Restricted Core for Totally Positive Games with Ordered Players
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Vasil'ev, Valeri - Tinbergen Institute
nonnegative), and there is some hierarchical ordering of the players. In this paper we introduce the 'Restricted Core' for such … of the players. For totally positive games this solution is always contained in the 'Core', and contains the well … coalitions). For special orderings it equals the Core, respectively Shapley value. We provide an axiomatization and apply this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005016260
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Computation of the nucleolus for a class of disjunctive games with a permission structure
Brink, René van den; Katsev, Ilya; Laan, Gerard van der - 2008
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A well-known solution is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376532