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One of the most famous ranking methods for digraphs is the ranking by Copeland score. The Copeland score of a node in a digraph is the difference between its outdegree (i.e. its number of outgoing arcs) and its indegree (i.e. its number of ingoing arcs). In the ranking by Copeland score, a node...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023971
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2012, 39, 721-735. <P> Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256206
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137204
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349197
costs be shared among the agents. Ni and Wang (2007) first consider this problem as cost sharing problems on a river network …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333054
In this paper we consider the problem of sharing water from a river among a group of agents (countries, cities, firms) located along the river. The benefit of each agent depends on the amount of water consumed by the agent. An allocation of the water among the agents is efficient when it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720752
We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012057177
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for two-sided markets with transferable utility, that satisfy some valuation monotonicity and fairness axioms. Valuation fairness requires that changing the valuation of a buyer for the object of a seller leads to equal changes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011901866
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