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In this paper, we connect the social network theory on centrality measures to the economic theory of preferences and … different networks. The famous degree measure assigns to every position in a weighted network the sum of the weights of all … links with its neighbours. A crucial property of a preference relation over network positions is neutrality to ordinary risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688772
A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of … symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the power of each coalition of positions in … the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the beta-measure, which reflects the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343952
Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure …. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common … models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012434059
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011349197
Complementary to the axiomatic and mechanism design studies on queueing problems, this paper proposes a strategic bargaining approach to resolve queueing conflicts. Given a situation where players with different waiting costs have to form a queue in order to be served, they firstly compete with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010238945
One of the most famous ranking methods for digraphs is the ranking by Copeland score. The Copeland score of a node in a digraph is the difference between its outdegree (i.e. its number of outgoing arcs) and its indegree (i.e. its number of ingoing arcs). In the ranking by Copeland score, a node...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023971
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002982808
This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'Social Choice and Welfare', 2012, 39, 721-735. <P> Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but...</p>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256206
Many economic organizations have some relational structure, meaning that economic agents do not only differ with respect to certain individual characteristics such as wealth and preferences, but also belong to some relational structure in which they usually take different positions. Two examples...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005137204
The Shapley value of a cooperative transferable utility game distributes the dividendof each coalition in the game equally among its members. Given exogenous weightsfor all players, the corresponding weighted Shapley value distributes the dividendsproportionally to their weights. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866535