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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical Economics 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of biddersâ€™ independent signals. If the object is optimally sold with probability one, then the optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, with the highest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189042

The limits of price discrimination

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: The American economic review 105 (2015) 3, pp. 921-957

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010519892

The limits of price discrimination

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009746491

Counterfactuals with latent information

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: American economic review 112 (2022) 1, pp. 343-368

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799571

Search, information, and prices

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Journal of political economy 129 (2021) 8, pp. 2275-2319

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012610496

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1399-1434

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415457

Optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647505

Informationally robust optimal auction design

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647506

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012098851

Countering the winner's curse : optimal auction design in a common value model

Bergemann, Dirk; Brooks, Ben; Morris, Stephen - 2018

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of bidders' independent signals. The optimal mechanism exhibits either neutral selection, wherein the object is randomly allocated at a price that all bidders are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011948704