blessing of large electorates in addition to information aggregation as postulated by the jury theorem. …

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a … information if media technology is available because then they do not condition their informational decisions on being pivotal …-ride. Further, we show how the quality of information depends on the size of the electorate, the prior knowledge of voters and on …

common Downsian reasoning, rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives … apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media. In … instrumental information in these scenarios. Our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of …

common Downsian reasoning, rational voters should not be willing to pay for information out of purely instrumental motives … apply when a group of voters shares a common goal such as accountability and information is delivered via mass media. In … instrumental information in these scenarios. Our model thus reconciles the rational voter approach with the common perception of …

blessing of large electorates in addition to information aggregation as postulated by the jury theorem. …

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a … information if media technology is available because then they do not condition their informational decisions on being pivotal …-ride. Further, we show how the quality of information depends on the size of the electorate, the prior knowledge of voters and on …