Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 184
Cover Image
Does High Involvement Management Lead to Higher Pay?
Bockerman, Petri - 2011
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130705
Cover Image
CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter?
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013
CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We … enterprises (SOEs) were privatised. CEO incentive contracts are negatively correlated with foreign ownership and with the … executives. Rapid SOE privatisation is associated with higher city and firm-level adoption of CEO incentive contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884490
Cover Image
Who posts performance bonds and why? Evidence from China's CEOs
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - In: China Economic Review 30 (2014) C, pp. 520-529
firm sales volatility. The complementarity between bonds and other incentive mechanisms such as bonuses and stock holding … Communist Party ranks, were promoted via tournaments, and run larger firms, findings consistent with using bonds as an incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931675
Cover Image
CEO Bonding: Who Posts Performance Bonds and Why?
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012
appear to be complements to rather than substitutes for other forms of corporate incentive. The negative association between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010535360
Cover Image
The CEO Labour Market in China's Public Listed Companies
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2012
performance and relying on incentive structures within firms to foster executive talent. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010551657
Cover Image
CEO Incentive Contracts in China: Why Does City Location Matter?
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - Centre for Economic Performance, LSE - 2013
CEO incentive contracts are commonplace in China but their incidence varies significantly across Chinese cities. We … enterprises (SOEs) were privatised. CEO incentive contracts are negatively correlated with foreign ownership and with the … executives. Rapid SOE privatisation is associated with higher city and firm-level adoption of CEO incentive contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010610739
Cover Image
What do we know about China's CEO's?: evidence from across the whole economy
Bryson, Alex; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012
economy. We do so using World Bank enterprise data for the first part of the 21st Century. Incentive schemes are commonplace … performance bonds, and holding company stock. These incentive mechanisms appear to complement rather than substitute for one … penalties if they fail to deliver. Incentive contracts are used to attract the most talented executives, as indicated by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745536
Cover Image
Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
Böckerman, Petri; Bryson, Alex; Ilmakunnas, Pekka - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008835360
Cover Image
Who posts performance bonds and why?: evidence from China's CEOs
Bryson, Alex; Forth, John; Zhou, Minghai - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014
firm sales volatility. The complementarity between bonds and other incentive mechanisms such as bonuses and stock holding … Communist Party ranks, were promoted via tournaments, and run larger firms, findings consistent with using bonds as an incentive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126044
Cover Image
Does high involvement management lead to higher pay?
Böckerman, Petri; Bryson, Alex; Ilmakunnas, Pekka - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2011
Using nationally representative survey data for Finnish employees linked to register data on their wages and work histories we find wage effects of high involvement management (HIM) practices are generally positive and significant. However, employees with better wage and work histories are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071162