Showing 1 - 10 of 62
We study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281225
We study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649146
We study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600084
This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498010
This paper estimates the impact of competition policy on total factor productivity growth for 22 industries in twelve OECD countries over 1995 to 2005. We find a positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by created indexes. We provide results based on instrumental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011010002
This paper empirically investigates the effectiveness of competition policy by estimating its impact on Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth for 22 industries in 12 OECD countries over the period 1995-2005. We find a robust positive and significant effect of competition policy as measured by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009223307
The aim of this paper is to describe in detail a set of newly developed indicators of the quality of competition policy, Competition Policy Indexes, or CPIs. The CPIs measure the deterrence properties of a competition policy in a jurisdiction, where for competition policy we mean the antitrust...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009371786
We study the effect of a merger in a dynamic high-technology industry-the videogame market- which is characterized by frequent introduction of new products. To assess the impact of the merger between two large specialist retailers in the UK, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010698826
Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011168913
This chapter provides a comprehensive discussion of the deterrence properties of a competition policy regime. On the basis of the economic theory of law enforcement, we identify several factors that are likely to affect its degree of deterrence: (1) sanctions and damages; (2) financial and human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186189