contribution is two-fold. First, we expand the theory of granularity to encompass the Bertrand competition frequently used in … right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. Also, the presence of big banks as measured by high market …

(Gabaix, 2011) for the banking sector, introducing Bertrand competition and heterogeneous banks charging variable markups …. Using this framework, we show conditions under which idiosyncratic shocks to bank lending can generate aggregate … sector for many countries is indeed granular, as the right tail of the bank size distribution follows a power law. We then …

Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and … for public finances. Regimes for the restructuring and resolution of banks, financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops …, seek to reduce these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and to increase the costs of leverage. This …

Bank distress can have severe negative consequences for the stability of the financial system, the real economy, and … public finances. Regimes for restructuring and restoring banks financed by bank levies and fiscal backstops seek to reduce … these costs. Bank levies attempt to internalize systemic risk and increase the costs of leverage. This paper evaluates the …

enhances the incentives of banks to expand within Euroland. Yet, while the currency bias in bank portfolios will be eliminated …