Showing 1 - 10 of 17
It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit build-out. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of budget-constrained bidders. Low prices maximize overall the gains from trade. If there are n licenses, the price where the budget constraint just binds maximizes consumer surplus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851321
We consider a model of preference in an asymmetric procurement auction with two suppliers. The buyer can award the contract to a preferred supplier at the bid of a competing supplier. As such, the preferred supplier has a right-of-first-refusal. The preferred supplier may be an independent firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851359
In the presence of cost uncertainty, limited liability introduces the possibility of default in procurement with its associated bankruptcy costs. When financial soundness is not perfectly observable, we show that incentive compatibility implies that financially less sound contractors are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851473
We propose and analyze a new solution concept, theR-solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851496
We develop a model of the interacting markets for online content and offline products. We portray content providers and the search engine as competing platforms that intermediate in the product market (a horizontal relation), while also vertically related in the content market. Explicitly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010740570
This paper investigates the design of optimal procurement mechanisms in the presence of corruption. After the sponsor and the contractor sign the contract, the latter may bribe the inspector to misrepresent quality. Thus, the mechanism affects whether bribery occurs. I show how to include...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011095071
In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyers ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547160
The Millennium Declaration (2000) set as one of its targets a substantial reduction in child mortality. This paper studies whether the massive increase in development aid can account for part of the reduction in child mortality observed in developing countries since the year 2000. To do so, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547168
This paper considers the problem of designing selling procedures for substitutes (like condominium units). I show that oral, ascending auctions for the right to choose are efficient. This is a common type of auction used for the sale of real estate. Efficiency is not optimal from the seller's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547200
The existence of ex-ante strong incumbents is a barrier to entry in auctions for goods such as licenses. Introducing inefficiencies that favor entrants is a way to induce entry and thus create competition. Designs such as the Anglo-Dutch auction have been proposed with this goal in mind. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547297