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Strengthening the institutional architecture of the Economic and Monetary Union

Buti, Marco (ed.); Giudice, Gabriele (ed.); … - 2020

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012257213

The Stability Pact pains : a forward-looking assessment of the reform debate

Buti, Marco; Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.; Franco, Daniele - In: Sustainability of public debt, (pp. 131-160). 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003821380

[Rezension von: Buti, Marco; Franco, Daniele, Fiscal policy in economic and monetary union, theory, evidence and institutions]

Csaba, László - In: Acta oeconomica : periodical of the Hungarian Academy … 56 (2006) 4, pp. 458-460

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003420104

From deficits to debt and back : political incentives under numerical fiscal rules

Buti, Marco; Nogueira Martins, João; Turrini, Alessandro - In: CESifo economic studies : CESifo, a joint initiative of … 53 (2007) 1, pp. 115-152

Under numerical fiscal rules, such as those underpinning EMU, governments have strong temptations to use accounting tricks to meet the fiscal constraints. Given these political incentives, fiscal variables that in the past were regarded as a mere residual acquire a strategic role. This is the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003467520