In this paper we: (i) provide a model of endogenous risk intolerance and serve aggregate demand contractions following a large (non-financial) shock; and (ii) demonstrate the effectiveness of Large Scale Asset Purchases (LSAPs) in addressing these contractions. The key mechanism stems from...

Should monetary policymakers raise interest rates during a boom to rein in financial excesses? We theoretically investigate this question using an aggregate demand model with asset price booms and financial speculation. In our model, monetary policy affects financial stability through its impact...

Global risk-off shocks can be highly destabilizing for financial markets and, absent an adequate policy response, may trigger severe recessions. Policy responses were more complex for developed economies with very low interest rates after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We document, however,...

Global risk-off shocks can be highly destabilising for financial markets and, absent an adequate policy response, may trigger severe recessions. In Caballero and Kamber (2019), we document that the unconventional policies adopted by the main central banks were effective in containing asset price...

Central banks (the Fed) and markets (the market) often disagree about the path of interest rates. We develop a model where these different views stem from disagreements between the Fed and the market about future aggregate demand. We then study the implications of these disagreements for...

We theoretically analyze the interactions between asset prices, nancial speculation, and macroeconomic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand. If the interest rate is constrained, a rise in the risk premium lowers asset prices and generates a demand recession. This reduces...

We provide a continuous-time "risk-centric" representation of the New Keynesian model, which we use to analyze the interactions between asset prices, financial speculation, and macroeconomic outcomes when output is determined by aggregate demand. In principle, interest rate policy is highly...

One of the main economic villains before the crisis was the presence of large “global imbalances.” The concern was that the U.S. would experience a sudden stop of capital flows, which would unavoidably drag the world economy into a deep recession. However, when the crisis finally did come,...

Severe financial crises in developed economies are produced by a combination of three factors: negative surprises that create uncertainty, concentration of macroeconomic risk in leveraged financial institutions and a slow policy response. We propose a policy instrument, Tradable Insurance...