Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks … policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance is lower when manager ownership shares are higher …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks … policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance is lower when manager ownership shares are higher …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks … policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance is lower when manager ownership shares are higher …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks … policies, risk, and methods of risk management. Formal corporate governance is lower when manager ownership shares are higher …