Although employees' time estimates are used extensively for costing purposes, they are prone to measurement error. In an experimental setting, we research how measurement error in time estimates varies with: (1) the level of aggregation in the definition of costing system activities (aggregated...

Although creative ideas frequently meet with rejection in many organizations, the consequences of such rejection on future creative performance remain largely unexamined. Using an experiment, we examine whether the effect on future creative performance arising from the rejection of creative...

Recently, many organizations have installed calibration committees to review and adjust subjective performance evaluations of supervisors about their employees. This study uses an experimental setting to examine the impact of calibration committees on supervisor evaluation behavior. We predict...

Operating distortion causes inefficiencies in performance measurement systems and typically remains hidden in firms' operational layers, unless managers report its occurrence. One obstacle to managers reporting operating distortion is that they often benefit economically from remaining silent...

Classical agency theory argues that economic incentives can have a strong impact on opportunistic reporting behavior. On the other hand, behavioral literature suggests that agents also adhere to descriptive norms established by peers. Most studies examine these effects in isolation, ignoring the...

Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal's active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal's choice for a truth-telling incentive contract,...

In multi-level organizations, BU employees create budgetary slack from which the entire business unit may benefit but doing so causes agency costs for the organization. Relying on social identity theory, we predict and find, in data gathered by means of an experiment, that shortening the social...

Principals make decisions on various issues, ranging from contract design to control system implementation. Few studies examine the principal’s active role in these decisions. We experimentally investigate this role by studying how a principal’s choice for a truth-telling incentive contract,...

We experimentally examine whether ranking employees on a social dimension can help them learn something about their self-concept and can foster better ethical decisions afterwards. We examine this question in the context of popular employee-giving programs, whereby proponents argue that such...

This study experimentally examines whether task-specific experience acquired by managers influences their reliance on performance-based contracts to motivate employees in a setting in which the employee’s task can spark intrinsic motivation. Building on experiential learning theory, we predict...