We consider a problem of derivatives design under asymmetry of information: the principal sells a contingent claim to an agent, the type of whom he does not know. More precisely, the principal designs a contingent claim and prices it for each possible agent type, in such a way that each agent...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...

We consider H expected utility maximizers that have to share a risky aggregate multivariate endowment X∈RN and address the following two questions: does efficient risk-sharing imply restrictions on the form of individual consumptions as a function of X ? Can one identify the individual utility...

In this article, we study a class of functions defined by a system of linear inequalities which arises naturally in at least four different economic issues: redistribution, spatial economics, theory of incentives and utility theory. The main tool used to study solutions of those inequalities...

We are given a list of tasks Z and a population divided into several groups X j of equal size. Performing one task z requires constituting a team with exactly one member x j from every group. There is a cost (or reward) for participation: if type x j chooses task z, he receives p j (z);...