In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.

This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic...

This paper proposes a comprehensive perspective on the question of self-enforcing solutions for normal form games. While this question has been widely discussed in the literature, the focus is usually either on strict incentives for players to stay within the proposed solution or on strategic...

It is a well known fact that for any finite extensive form game G there is a strategy profile σ which, together with an appropriate system of beliefs μ, constitutes a sequential equilibrium of G (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). However, as we demonstrate in this paper, there are sequential equilibria...