Relationships are a valuable technology to produce loans. (Berger and Udell [1995], Petersen and Rajan [1994], Aoki and Dinç [2002]). While there are convincing theories in which relationships solve hidden action or hidden information problems, there is very little empirical corroboration of...

While the literature has focused on relationships as a technology for solving hidden information problems in credit markets, hidden action has been very little explored as an explanation for the existence of relational lending. In this paper, we propose a theory in which relationships are driven...

We study the interaction between dispersed and sticky information by assuming that firms receive private noisy signals about the state in an otherwise standard model of price setting with sticky-information. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium of the incomplete information game...

In this note, I consider a setting in which an agent can exert costly unobservable effort towards two activities and is, a priori, uncertain about its ability to perform them. A (non-contractible) ability enhancing investment can be performed. The lack of commitment from a Principal concerned...

This paper investigates the extent to which syndication in financial markets is related to collusive behavior. A group of financiers who have private information regarding their capability of monitoring an entrepreneur must decide whether to provide a loan individually in a competitive fashion,...

Corporate Boards usually come in two different shapes: unitary and dual. In the former, a single board/principal is responsible for monitoring and establishing performance targets; in the latter, these tasks are split between two boards/principals. This paper compares these two arrangements in...