Showing 1 - 10 of 10
We demonstrate that if any realization of a strategy for a Bayesiangame is, with high probability, an approximate Nash equilibrium of the induced game of complete information, then there is purification of that strategy that is an approximate equilibrium of the original Bayesian game. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368553
We consider a general equilibrium local public goods economy in which agents have two distinguishing characteristics. The first is 'crowding type', which is publicly observable and provides direct costs or benefits to the jurisdiction (coalition or firms) the agent joins. The second is taste...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368593
We introduce a framework of noncooperative pregames, in which players are characterized by their attributes, and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (e) Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In fact, every mixed strategy equilibrium can be used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368599
We model a learning dynamic in which players imitate and innovate. Of interest is to question whether Nash equilibrium play emerges, and if so, the role that imitation plays in this emergence. Our main result provides a general class of coordination games for which approximate Nash equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368642
Is conformity amongst similar individuals consistent with self-interested behavior? We consider a model of incomplete information in which each player receives a signal, interpreted as an allocation to a role, and can make his action choice conditional on his role. Our main result demonstrates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368685
It has been frequently observed, in both economics and psychology, that individuals tend to conform to the choices of other individuals with whom they identify. Can such conformity be consistent with self interested behaviour? To address this question we use the framework of games with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005368713
Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large " must be,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005747081
We illustrate one way in which a population of boundedly rational individuals can learn to play an approximate Nash equilibrium. Players are assumed to make strategy choices using a combination of imitation and innovation. We begin by looking at an imitation dynamic and provide conditions under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005748223
In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005583039
We introduce a framework of noncooperative games, allowing both countable sets of pure strategies and player types, in which players are characterized by their attributes and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium can be used to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005583041