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This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014618026
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734516
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787968
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005246435
This work examines the relationship between national identity and conflict during international sporting tournaments and the impact of referees as an institutional countermeasure. The empirical analysis covers the FIFA World, Confederations and Under 20's World Cups and Olympic tournaments from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014119097
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835709
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835785
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789451
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486659