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This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014618026
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently a contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789451
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835709
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835785
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008486659
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005246435
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two rational and risk-neutral opponents conflict in order to appropriate a positive fraction of a stake. This paper is intended to extend the literature on conflict dealing with two main points: (1) the incentives to settle...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027299
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003778202
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011787968
This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734516