This paper finds an empirical evidence that al Qaeda behaves as a contest organizer rewarding a prize to candidate extremist groups. Would-be terrorists must then compete with each other to prove their commitment and ability. Hence to maximize their own probability of winning the prize, each...

The main objective of this paper is to empirically investigate the socio-economic causes of terrorism and political violence in a sample of 12 countries in Western Europe. Results are mixed. First, we show that in western European countries the classical economic argument of opportunity cost can...

What is the impact of sport participation on society? This paper is tackling this point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997–2003. Results show that:...

What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a society? The first aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian...

What is the broad impact of sport participation and sport activities in a society? The first aim of this paper is tackling this crucial point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian...

Introduzione – 1. La dimensione relazionale – 2. Sport e Crimine: una prima analisi empirica – 3. Sport, Sviluppo e Produttività: una seconda analisi empirica – Conclusioni e implicazioni di politica economica

What is the impact of sport participation on a society? The aim of this paper is tackling this point by studying whether or not there is a relationship between sport participation and crime. A panel dataset have been constructed for the twenty Italian regions over the period 1997-2003. Results...

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict....

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the option of choosing a second instrument to affect the...

This note is about the possibility of a stalemate in a continuing conflict. Following the prevailing economic literature on the topic, under some assumptions, the outcome of a conflict can be described in two ways: (i) a predetermined split of a contested output; (ii) a winner-take-all contest...