The existing literature on training is concerned with understanding the reasons why firms pay for the general skills of their workers, but without explaining which firms train which workers. This paper develops a theory that both explains the willingness of firms to pay for general training, and...

We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection...

We develop a model that nests previous explanations for women under-representation in positions of power. Focusing on democratic electoral dynamics, our framework delineates the three types of mechanisms that may be at play: consumer demand, candidate supply, and internal party dynamics beyond...

The existing literature on training is concerned with understanding the reasons whyfirms pay for the general skills of their workers, but without explaining which firmstrain which workers. This paper develops a theory that both explains the willingnessof firms to pay for general training, and...