We show that cross-country differences in the underlying volatility and persistence of macroeconomic shocks help explain two historical regularities in sovereign borrowing: the existence of ""vicious"" circles of borrowing-and-default (""default traps""), as well as the fact that recalcitrant...

We show that cross-country differences in the underlying volatility and persistence of macroeconomic shocks help explain two historical regularities in sovereign borrowing: the existence of "vicious" circles of borrowing-and-default ("default traps"), as well as the fact that recalcitrant...

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders about the nature of output shocks. In such an environment, default creates a pessimistic outlook about the borrower's output...

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This...

We show that cross-country differences in the underlying volatility and persistence of macroeconomic shocks help explain two historical regularities in sovereign borrowing: the existence of quot;viciousquot; circles of borrowing-and-default (quot;default trapsquot;), as well as the fact that...