In this paper, we revisit the issue of bank fragility in the Diamond and Dybvig (J Polit Econ 91:401–419, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1983</CitationRef>) model with sequential service and finite traders. We provide a precise condition under which banks are susceptible to a run when the return on investment is low, and we show that...</citationref>

We study the e¤ects of population size in the Peck-Shell analysis of bank runs. We nd that a contract featuring equal-treatment for al- most all depositors of the same type approximates the optimum. Because the approximation also satis es Green-Lin incentive constraints, when the planner...

We find that in order to have circulating counterfeit notes as part of the optimal mechanism, there must be heterogeneity of opportunities to create and circulate counterfeit among agents. When such heterogeneity exists, we find that counterfeiting creates distortions at both the intensive and...

Sequential service in the banking sector, as modeled by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), is a barrier to full insurance and potential source of financial fragility against which deposit insurance is infeasible (Wallace, 1988). In this paper, we pursue a different perspective, viewing the sequence of...

We introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which we identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse,...

We introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which we identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a central clearinghouse,...

The authors introduce an element of centralization in a random matching model of money that allows for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange. Some agents, which the authors identify as banks, are endowed with the technology to issue notes and to record-keep reserves with a...

We show that price stickiness is predicted by the theory of second best, applied to a random- matching model of money. The economy is hit with iid, aggregate, preference shocks, and allocations are allowed to be history dependent. Due to individual anonymity and lack of commitment, implementable...

Should monetary policy be cyclical? The debate around this question is old but has benefited very little from research on the pure theory of money. In our model, people trade in pairs, without double coincidence of wants and face seasonal fluctuations. Monetary policy is restricted to taxing...