We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituency sets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity is carried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervised by a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of the constituency,...

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since...

We study relative performance evaluation in executive compensation when executives have private information about their ability. We assume that the joint distribution of an individual firm’s profit and market movements depends on the ability of the executive that runs the firm. In the...

We analyze the impact of different types of international conventions that require signatory countries to penalize domestic firms that are found to have bribed foreign public officials. We analyze enforcement of penalties under a convention styled after the OECD's 'Convention on Combating...

We analyze risk sharing and fiscal spending in a two-region model with complete markets. Fiscal policy determines tax rates for each state of nature. When fiscal policy is decentralized, it can be used to affect prices of securities. To manipulate prices to their beneffit, regions choose...