We introduce monitored bank loans and non-monitored tradeable securities as sources of external finance for firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Due to frictions arising from moral hazard, access to credit and each type of financial instrument are determined by the wealth distribution....

We study bank-based and market-based financial systems in an endogenous growth model. Lending to firms is fraught with moral hazard as owner-managers may reduce investment profitability to enjoy private benefits. Bank monitoring partially resolves the agency problem, while market-finance is more...

We study bank-based and market-based financial systems in an endogenous growth model. Lending to firms is fraught with moral hazard as owner-managers may reduce investment profitability to enjoy private benefits. Bank monitoring partially resolves the agency problem, while market-finance is more...

We introduce monitored bank loans and non-monitored tradeable securities as sources of external finance for firms in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Due to frictions arising from moral hazard, access to credit and each type of financial instrument are determined by the wealth distribution....