Hedgers and a risk-neutral informed trader choose between a broker who takes a position in the asset (a capital broker) and a broker who does not (a discount broker). The capital broker exploits order flow information to mimic informed trades and offset hedgers' trades, reducing informed profits...

Hedgers and a risk-neutral informed trader choose between a broker who takes a position in the asset (a capital broker) and a broker who does not (a discount broker). The capital broker exploits order flow information to mimic informed trades and offset hedgers' trades, reducing informed profits...

In contrast to most other countries, Chinese foreign class B shares trade at an average discount of about 60 percent to the prices at which domestic A shares trade. We argue that one reason for the large price discount of B shares is because foreign investors have less information on Chinese...

Multiple informed traders and noise traders pay fees to trade through multiple brokers. Brokers may trade with their customers in the same transaction (simultaneous dual trading) or trade after their customers in a separate transaction (consecutive dual trading). Brokers' expected profits from...

We study a variety of issues related to brokers' trading. In our model, multiple informed traders and noise traders trade through multiple brokers. Brokers may trade with their customers in the same transaction (simultaneous dual trading) or trade after their customers in a separate transaction...

We investigate, both theoretically and empirically, the relation between the adverse selection and fixed costs of trading and the number of informed traders in a financial asset. As a proxy for informed traders, we use dual traders -- i.e., futures floor traders who execute trades both for their...

We study competitive, but strategic, brokers executing trades for an informed trader in multi-period setting. The brokers can choose to (a) execute the order, as agents, first, and trade for themselves as dealers, afterwards; or (b) trade for themselves first and execute the order later. We show...

We investigate the relation between the number of informed traders in a financial asset and the estimated adverse selection cost of trading in that asset, lambda, after controlling for the effects of previously identified determinants of market liquidity. As a proxy for informed traders, we use...

We study competitive, but strategic, brokers executing trades for an informed trader in a multi-period setting. The brokers can choose to (a) execute the order, as agents, first, and trade for themselves, as dealers, afterwards; or (b) trade for themselves first and execute the order later. We...

We examine the determinants of the realized bid-ask spread in the U.S. corporate, municipal and government bond markets for the years 1995 to 1997, based on newly available transactions data. Overall, we find that liquidity is an important determinant of the realized bid-ask spread in all three...