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A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States
Blouin, Max; Serrano, Roberto - Brown University, Department of Economics - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094145
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Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture
Charness, Gary - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 1998
outcome] conveys no information about what the players will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as an … of B moves is only 35%. I also test a hypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects the results, finding …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005772240
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Promises & Partnership
Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin - Nationalekonomiska institutionen, Stockholms Universitet - 2003
We examine, experimentally and theoretically, how communication within a partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What is the form and content of the communication? Which model of decision-making can capture the impact of communication? We consider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645507
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Deception: The role of guilt
Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Charness, Gary; Dufwenberg, Martin - In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 93 (2013) C, pp. 227-232
Evidence suggests that whether or not people dislike lying is situation-dependent. We argue that the theory of simple guilt can accommodate this well.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702934
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Bargaining on networks: An experiment
Charness, Gary; Corominas, Margarida - Department of Economics and Business, Universitat … - 2000
, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and … confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among … people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005771991
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Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003
Serrano, Roberto - In: Investigaciones Economicas 29 (2005) 2, pp. 219-258
This paper is a survey of the work in the Nash program for coalitional games, a research agenda proposed by Nash (1953) to bridge the gap between the non-cooperative and cooperative approaches to game theory. (Copyright: Fundación SEPI)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005813655
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The Dark Side of Competition for Status
Charness, Gary; Masclet, David; Villeval, Marie Claire - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Économique Lyon … - 2014
Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare. We investigate experimentally the role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s performance ranking in a flat-wage environment. We find that average effort is higher when individuals are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161035
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Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection
Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014
complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since … wide variety of settings. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior … coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011086477
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Promises in contract design
Charness, Gary; Du, Ninghua; Yang, Chun-Lei; Yao, Lan - In: European Economic Review 64 (2013) C, pp. 194-208
In this paper, we propose a new channel of contract design to boost efficiency. If deviating from one's own words induces a self-imposed moral burden, the optimal contracting procedure with regard to cheap talk shall assign the responsibility for installing the nonbinding promise in the contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729803
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Experimental games on networks: Underpinnings of behavior and equilibrium selection
Charness, Gary; Feri, Francesco; Meléndez-Jiménez, … - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für … - 2014
complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since … wide variety of settings. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior … coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010761741