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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354731
complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since … wide variety of settings. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior … coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344833
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779356
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055844
devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in a hidden information context. A principal offers one of three possible …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151603
We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixedstrategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation. For exact implementation, we identify a strengthening of Bayesian monotonicity, which we refer to as mixed Bayesian monotonicity. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284058
agents. Extensions to incomplete information environments are also obtained. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317077
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents’ payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318934
parameters to final outcomes. Typically, the underlying parameters (e.g., individual preferences) are private information to the … the private information is truthfully elicited and the social optimum ends up being implemented? In designing such a … mechanism, appropriate incentives will have to be given to the agents so that they do not wish to misrepresent their information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318948
A core allocation of a complete information economy can be characterized as one that would not be unanimously rejected … in favor of another feasible alternative by any coalition. We use this test of coalitional voting in an incomplete … information environment to formalize a notion of resilience. Since information transmission is implicit in the Bayesian equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318981