workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm …. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect …

workers' wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm …. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect …

We study worker and firm behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers' wages may potentially influence a … worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' responsiveness to co-workers' wages should lead profit …-maximizing firms to compress wages under quite general conditions. Our laboratory experiments, on the other hand, show that --while …

We study worker and firm behavior in an environment where worker effort could depend on co-workers' wages …. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' 'concerns' with co-workers' wages should lead profit-maximizing firms to … compress wages under quite general conditions. However, firms should be harmed by such concerns, and such concerns can justify …

We study worker and firm behavior in an efficiency-wage environment where co-workers' wages may potentially influence a … worker's effort. Theoretically, we show that an increase in workers' responsiveness to co-workers' wages should lead profit …-maximizing firms to compress wages under quite general conditions. Our laboratory experiments, on the other hand, show that --while …

groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort … wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and … wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of …