We study eciency and distributional implications of bargaining in a monopoly, where the shareholders and the workers delegate the task of bargaining to a manager and a union leader respectively. Bargaining delegation leads to underproduction caus- ing the organizational pie to contract severely...

If managers bargain with workers over wage before choosing output in a Cournot duopoly, owners face two conflicting interests in designing managerial incentives: one for profit orientation to reduce wage, and the other for sales orientation to gain in output competition. The net effect depends...

We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining...

We develop a model of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining to study efficiency and distributional implications in monopoly and in Cournot duopoly. In both markets delegation causes underproduction, but has contrasting implications for bargaining pie and for its distribution. In...