This note introduces labour market imperfection in an otherwise Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model and provides a theory of unionized wage formation. It demonstrates that this framework satisfies the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the magnification effect and that it is capable of producing...

The present paper develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender...

This paper purports to examine the validity of the common belief that in a developing economy the backward agricultural sector should be subsidized as poorer group of the working population are employed in this sector that send their children out to work out of sheer poverty. A three-sector...

The paper shows that the policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets is distinctly superior to the existing credit policy of horizontally substituting the informal sector by the formal one. An inflow of subsidized formal credit to the informal lenders not...

The paper examines the aptness of labour market reform in a developing country using a three-sector Harris-Todaro model with agricultural dualism and a non-traded final commodity. The paper, contrary to the common belief, finds that liberalization in the labour market may be desirable from the...

In this paper we analyze some aspects of cronyism and corruption in an emerging economy. We develop a three-stage game-theoretic model where the ruling political party and a capitalist interact with each other. The ruling party, in return of a donation from the capitalist, sets a policy that...

During the last 50 years with unprecedented population growth and urbanization, economic development, particularly in developing countries failed to generate adequate employment and income opportunities in the modern sector, compelling the surplus labour force to generate its own means of...

This note develops a model of two stage game between a corrupt trade union leader and the management of the firm where the former negotiates for the wage of the workers with the firm. The firm bribes the leader so that he keeps the wage as close as possible to the workers’ reservation wage....

We present a three-sector general equilibrium model with an informal sector, which produces an intermediate input for the formal sector, to analyze the effects of different policies on the environmental standard of the economy. The formal sector is made to pay a pollution emission tax for any...

We develop a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets which highlights the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially and the existing moneylender acts as a...