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Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018428
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Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018433
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Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 239-271
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855867
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Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents
Artemov, Georgy; Che, Yeon-Koo; He, Yinghua - 2022
---robust equilibrium---that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by … be non-truthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results … preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth-telling …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079700
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Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets
Che, Yeon-Koo; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 239-271
We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010026
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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2008
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770179
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An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study top trading cycles in a two-sided matching environment (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003)) under the assumption …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018434
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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008
The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005762718
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Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice : The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - 2009
The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances, which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156633
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Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice : The 'Boston' Mechanism Reconsidered
Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - 2009
The Boston mechanism is among the most popular school choice procedures in use. Yet, the mechanism has been criticized for its poor incentive and welfare performances, which led the Boston Public Schools to recently replace it with Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm (henceforth,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157013