We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection along with tight control of the media and labour unions. We find that firms with executives that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater...

We examine the influence of auditors on corporate fraud in China. We find lower executive integrity firms are associated with higher propensity of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We then show that this effect is moderated by the issuance of modified...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We examine whether analyst coverage influences corporate fraud in China. The fraud triangle specifies three main factors, i.e. opportunity, incentive, and rationalization. On the one hand, analysts may reduce the fraud opportunity factor through external monitoring aimed at discouraging...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...