Blume and Easly [1992] show that if agents have the same savings rule, an expected discounted logarithmic utility maximizer with correct beliefs will dominate. If no agent adopts this rule, then agents with incorrect beliefs, but equally averse to risk as logarithmic utility maximizers, may...

While early computational studies of bargaining strategies, such as Rust, Miller and Palmer (1993, 1994) and Andrew and Prager (1996) all indicates the significance of agent-based modeling in the follow-up research, a real agent-based model of bargaining strategies in DA markets has never been...

Various Computational Intelligence (CI) tools have been devised to depict the essential learning or adapting processes people adopt when they are making decisions. If the learning process people possess is indeed well described by some CI algorithms, then there arise an interesting question:...

This paper extends the N -person IPD game into a more interesting one in economics: the oligopoly game. Due to its dynamics of market share, the oligopoly game is more complicated and need not be exactly an N -person IPD game. Using genetic algorithms, we simulate oligopoly games under various...