This study investigates the impact of Delaware law on the composition and size of the board of directors. Our empirical evidence reveals that Delaware firms have smaller and more independent boards than their non-Delaware counterparts. Given that we find no value-premium for firms that...

Motivated by agency theory, we explore the potential impact of managerial entrenchment through staggered boards on dividend policy. The evidence suggests that firms with staggered boards are more likely to pay dividends and pay them more generously than do those with unitary boards. We also show...

Prior research shows that firms tend to recruit directors from the geographically-proximate area. Due to a limited supply of qualified individuals in a given area, firms located in close proximity have to share a limited pool of talented individuals. As a result, the larger the number of firms...

Using staggered board reforms as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, this study examines the impact of corporate governance on cash holdings in 41 countries. We find that board reforms are followed by significant reductions in cash holdings. This effect is more...

We study the impact of board reforms implemented in 40 countries worldwide on corporate dividend policy. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that firms pay higher dividends following the reforms. The increase in dividend payouts is more pronounced for firms with weak board...