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Anti-corruption policy-making, discretionary power, and institutional quality : an experimental analysis
Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert - 2016
We analyse policy makers' incentives to fight corruption under different institutional qualities. We find that 'public … officials', even when non-corrupt, significantly distort anti-corruption institutions by choosing a lower detection probability … legal equality can be considered worse in reducing corruption. Finally, corruption is significantly lower when the detection …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517268
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Deterrence, peer effect, and legitimacy in anti-corruption policy-making : an experimental analysis
Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert; Miettinen, Topi - 2016
Official A at almost all individual detection levels. This 'legitimacy' effect may help explain why anti-corruption policies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011568192
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Corruption and the shadow economy
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010506202
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Are new states more corrupt? : expert opinions vs. firms' experiences
Adhikari, Tamanna; Breen, Michael; Gillanders, Robert - 2017
We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that include additional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011736789
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Corruption and the shadow economy
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2002
This paper develops a simple framework to analyze the links between corruption and the unofficial economy and their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011408719
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The economics of repeated extortion
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2003
This paper provides a simple model of repeated extortion. In particular, we ask whether corrupt government officials' ex post opportunism to demand more once entrepreneurs have made sunk investments entails further distortion in resource allocations. We show that the inability of government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010507749
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Open for business? : institutions, business environment and economic development
Gillanders, Robert; Whelan, Karl - 2010
Recent years have seen a significant focus in the literature on growth and development on the idea that legal and political institutions are the key determinant of economic development. The main finding of this paper is that the focus on the primacy of legal and political institutions may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009729657
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Public sector corruption and trust in the private sector
Gillanders, Robert; Neselevska, Olga - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011478357
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The dynamics of corruption with the Ratchet effect
Choi, Jay Pil; Thum, Marcel - 2000
This paper provides a simple model of corruption dynamics with the ratchet effect. As in Shleifer and Vishny [1993], we … consider the sale of government property (entry permit) by government officials as the prototype of corruption activities. In a … also explore the effect of the official's tenure stability on the extent of corruption. This allows us to identify …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781612
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Effective anti-corruption policy-making : what can we learn from experimental economics?
Boly, Amadou; Gillanders, Robert - 2017
Experimental studies have shown that deterrence (monitoring and punishment) can be an effective anti-corruption policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011647621